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1. Introduction  
A strand of literature (Conner and Rumelt 1991, Takeyama 1994, Slive and Bernhardt 1998 
among others) on digital piracy advocates that tolerance of piracy may lead to higher profit 
to the copyright holder when the effect of network externality is strong. In spite losing sales 
due to piracy, the unauthorized reproduction of copies increases the installed base and 
network size of the digital product significantly, which translates into higher valuation of 
the original product. As a result, the copyright holder can charge a higher price of its 
product and earn higher profit compared to the case when piracy is not allowed. King and 
Lampe (2003) explained this phenomenon from a different angle and concluded that it is 
the interaction between price discrimination and piracy that drives this result. They argue 
against the finding and show that allowing piracy may not be profitable to the copyright 
holder, if the copyright holder can actually price discriminate between potential-pirates and 
non-pirates. In this paper, we try to shed a light from a different angle on the connection 
between network effect and piracy in a more general framework; and show that only under 
limited circumstances allowing piracy can be profitable to the copyright holder, however 
network effect may not play a significant role in driving the result. On the contrary, we 
find that the possibility to allow piracy actually decreases as the strength of network 
externality increases. 
Copyright violations or piracy for digital products is a very real phenomenon in 
today’s world. It not only affects the revenue stream of the copyrighted product, but also 
impacts innovation incentive in the digital industry. As a result, a lot of private investment 
from the copyright holders goes to limit the extent of piracy. At the same time, the IPR 
protection policies from public authorities are also tuned to encourage innovation and stop 
copyright violations. Given this, we consider a model of piracy which has these private and 
public anti-piracy policies in place. In our model, there is a monopoly copyright holder of 
the product who faces numerous end-use pirates. The copyright holder chooses a profit 
maximizing price and profit maximizing piracy deterrence level. No price discrimination 
is allowed.   
We focus to specifically see the impact of network externality on the extent of piracy, 
the rate of piracy and the original firm’s piracy deterrence strategy. We find that when 
consumers’ taste variety is sufficiently large compared to the degree of network externality 
and the IPR protection is weak, it is profitable for the original producer to allow piracy. 
This is where we find some support of allowing limited piracy in the presence of network 
externality. In all the other cases, it is profitable for the copyright holder to deter the pirate 
irrespective of the strength or degree of network externality. 
In the comparative analysis, we interestingly find that the possibility to tolerate piracy 
actually decreases as the degree of network externality increases. We also find that the 
profit maximizing piracy deterrence level chosen by the copyright holder increases with 
the degree of network externality. Further when the original producer allows piracy, the 
rate of piracy also decreases as the strength of network externality increases. Therefore, 
our findings mostly argue that impact of strong network effect may not be a good reason 
always to allow piracy in general, actually it may work otherwise. However, piracy can 
still happen in a limited way. 
 
 
 
2. The Framework 
There is one original product developer (the monopoly copyright holder) and a 
group of heterogeneous consumers who are also the potential pirates. The original product 
is of high quality and denoted by H while the pirated product is of low quality and denoted 
by L. We will interchangeably call the original product as the high quality product and the 
pirated product as the low quality product. The products exhibit the feature of positive 
network externality. However, the impact of the network effect or externality is asymmetric 
between the users of the original product and the pirated product. The original product has 
all latest features and applications to absorb all the network effect along with the support 
service from the producer, while the pirated product which is not licensed from the original 
producer has limited functionality and absorption capacity of the network effect. Therefore, 
the original quality differential influences the extent to which the network effect extends 
between H and L.  
In terms of utility, the consumer who buys original product, first of all, gets all the 
intrinsic benefit from the product due to its high quality; secondly, she also enjoys the full 
extent of the network externality generated by those users who also buy the original 
product, plus the (limited) network externality generated by the pirated product users. The 
buyers of the pirated product can enjoy all the value of the product (intrinsic as well as 
network) subject to limitation that the lower quality can permit. We normalize the quality 
of the original firm’s product to one. The quality of the pirated product is indexed by ݍ ∈ሺͲ,ͳሻ, where q captures the quality depreciation. Consumers with different valuations for 
the product are indexed by X which is uniformly distributed over the interval [Ͳ, ߠ] with 
density ଵ� . Consumers have the choice to buy the original product from the product 
developer or they can pirate themselves.  
The copyright holder undertakes costly investment to deter or limit piracy. It targets 
the end user pirates to stop or limit piracy as it stands to lose its potential market share 
because of them. It tries to make the piracy costly to the end-users by increasing the cost 
of copying by an amount x (ݔ ൒ Ͳ). We assume the cost of investment of the original 
product developer to set a level of deterrence, x to the end-user pirate, is given by 
  2 2oc x x .  Thus, the higher the investment made by the original product developer, the 
higher would be the cost of piracy to the end-user pirate. This is private protection.1 
There also exists a public protection to stop copyright violations in the form of IPR to 
reduce piracy in the economy which is denoted by c (ܿ ൒ Ͳ). Thus, when the level of 
private deterrence is x and the level of public deterrence is c, we assume the total deterrence 
or the cost of copying to an end-user is (c + x). We assumed an additive form between c 
and x since both the original firm’s private effort (investment) and the legal protection and 
enforcement of copyright legislations (public protection) contribute to the deterrence of 
piracy. We would like to interpret c  as the degree or the strength of IPR protection and it 
is exogenous to the model.2 
                                                 
1
 The deterrence level x could be technical or non-technical deterrence to the end-user pirate. If it is a technical 
deterrence, think of technical protection imbedded in the product for making copies difficult. The non-
technical deterrence could be private monitoring and informing the authority for penalty. 
2It is generally understood that the government or the regulatory authority can influence c. Different countries 
have different levels of IPR protections; it can be weak or strong. More importantly, for a country it takes a 
Given this environment, a typical consumer X’s utility function can be written as 
follows. � = { ܺ + ߛ(ܦ௢ + ݍܦ௣) − ݌              if buys the original product，ݍ[ܺ + ߛ(ܦ௢ + ܦ௣)] − ሺܿ + ݔሻ    if pirates the original product，Ͳ                                               if neither buys nor pirates,  
where ܦ௢ and ܦ௣ stand for the demand for the original product and the pirated product 
respectively and p is the price of the original product.  ߛ ൒ Ͳ
 
is the coefficient which 
measures the level or strength of network externalities. For example, higher ߛ  implies 
stronger effect of network externality, whereas when ߛ is close to zero, it implies almost 
no effect of network externality.3Note that the above utility framework captures the feature 
of asymmetric absorption capacities of the network externalities of the respective products. 
To ensure that ܦ௢ and ܦ௣ are nonnegative, we assume ߠ > ߛ. 
 
2.1 Deriving Demand for the Original and Pirated Products 
The demand for the original product and for the pirated product, ܦ௢ and ܦ௣, can be 
derived from the distribution of buyers as follows.  
Recall that consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their values towards the 
product. Thus, the marginal consumer, A, who is indifferent between buying the original 
product and the pirated version, is given byܣ + ߛ(ܦ௢ + ݍܦ௣) − ݌ =  ݍ[ܣ + ߛ(ܦ௢ +ܦ௣)] − ሺܿ + ݔሻ , or ܣ = ௣−ሺc+�ሻଵ−௤  − ߛܦ௢ . The marginal consumer, B, who is indifferent 
between buying the pirated product and not buying any product, is given byݍ[ܤ +ߛ(ܦ௢ + ܦ௣)] − ሺܿ + ݔሻ = Ͳ, or ܤ = �+�௤ – ߛ(ܦ௢ + ܦ௣). The marginal consumer, C, who is 
indifferent between buying the original product and not buying at all, is given by ܥ +ߛ(ܦ௢ + ݍܦ௣) − ݌ = Ͳ , or ܥ = ݌– ߛ(ܦ௢ + ݍܦ௣) . Define ܺ̂ = ݉�ݔ{ܣ, ܥ}  and ܻ̂ =݉�݊{ܤ, ܥ, Ͳ}. Then the demand for the original product is ܦ௢ = ଵ� ∫ ݀ݔ�௑̂ and the demand for 
the pirated product is ܦ௣ = ଵ� ∫ ݀ݔ௑̂௒̂ . It turns out that the demand functions can be written 
as the following: 
ܦ௢ = {   
   ሺଵ−௤ሻ�−(௣−ሺ�+�ሻ)ሺଵ−௤ሻሺ�−�ሻ             �݂ ݍ݌ ൒ ܿ + ݔ �݊݀ ߛ ൑ ௣−ሺ�+�ሻଵ−௤ ,�−௣�−�                                  �݂ ݍ݌ ൑ ܿ + ݔ �݊݀ ݌ ൒ ߛ,ͳ                                                               ݋ݐℎ݁ݎݓ�ݏ݁,   
                       (1) 
and 
                                                 
long time to adjust its IPR policy (more so if the government of that country is not very pro-active to reform 
IPR related policies), hence we assume it to be exogenous in our model. 
3
 See also Banerjee (2003) for a similar utility function.  
ܦ௣ = {  
  ௤௣−ሺ�+�ሻ௤ሺଵ−௤ሻሺ�−�ሻ         �݂ ݍ݌ ൒ ܿ + ݔ �݊݀ ߛ ൑ �+�௤ ,௣−ሺ�+�ሻ−ሺଵ−௤ሻ�ሺଵ−௤ሻሺ�−�ሻ  �݂ ݍ݌ ൒ ܿ + ݔ �݊݀ �+�௤ ൑ ߛ ൑ ௣−ሺ�+�ሻଵ−௤ ,Ͳ                                      ݋ݐℎ݁ݎݓ�ݏ݁.                     (2) 
 
2.2 Choice of Profit Maximizing Price and Level of Deterrence by the Product 
Developer 
Note that as long as the high quality firm chooses p and x such that it obtains all the 
demand, it will choose a boundary solution since it has no incentive to choose a lower price 
for given x. However, the boundary solution is already included as a possibility into the 
first two scenarios specified by the demand function (1) given the continuity of the original 
firm’s profit function. Thus, we need to compare the high quality firm's profits in the first 
two scenarios only, namely, (i) ݍ݌ ൒ ܿ + ݔ and ߛ ൑ ௣−ሺ�+�ሻଵ−௤ and (ii) ݍ݌ ൑ ܿ + ݔ and ݌ ൒
γ. 
When the developer chooses p and x such thatݍ݌ ൒ ܿ + ݔ and ߛ ൑ ௣−ሺ�+�ሻଵ−௤ , the firm’s 
profit maximization problem is  
       
 
2
0, 0
1 1
max
1 2
. .  and 
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, 
which is labeled Problem I.  
When the developer chooses p and x such that ݍ݌ ൑ ܿ + ݔ and ݌ ൒ γ, the firm’s profit 
maximization problem is  
  2
0, 0
1
max
2
. .  and 
o o op x
ppD c x p x
s t qp c x p
  

 
      
  
, 
which is labeled Problem II. 
We summarize the optimum in the following proposition after solving Problems I and 
II and comparing the product developer’s profits in these two problems (see Appendix). 
Define ߜሺݍ, ߠ, ߛሻ ≡ ݉�݊ {ߠ ௤ሺଵ−௤ሻሺ�−�ሻ−ଵሺଶ−௤ሻሺ�−�ሻ , ሺͳ − ݍሻሺߠ − ʹߛሻ − ͳ} = {ߠ ௤ሺଵ−௤ሻሺ�−�ሻ−ଵሺଶ−௤ሻሺ�−�ሻ                   �݂ Ͳ ൑ ߛ ൑ ଵ−௤ଶ−௤ ߠ ሺͳ − ݍሻሺߠ − ʹߛሻ − ͳ    �݂ ߛ ൒ ଵ−௤ଶ−௤ ߠ . 
Note that ߜሺݍ, ߠ, ߛሻ > Ͳ if and only if ߠ > ݉�ݔ { ଵ௤ሺଵ−௤ሻ+ ߛ, ଵଵ−௤ + ʹߛ}. Since γ can be as 
small as zero, ߠ > ଵ௤ሺଵ−௤ሻ ensures ߜሺݍ, ߠ, ߛሻ > Ͳ for a range of ߛ. We further assume ߠ >ଶ−௤௤ሺଵ−௤ሻ so that when ߛ = ଵ−௤ଶ−௤ ߠ, ߠ ௤ሺଵ−௤ሻሺ�−�ሻ−ଵሺଶ−௤ሻሺ�−�ሻ = ሺͳ − ݍሻሺߠ − ʹߛሻ − ͳ = ௤ሺଵ−௤ሻ�−ଵሺଶ−௤ሻ > Ͳ. 
When ଵ௤ሺଵ−௤ሻ < ߠ ൑ ଶ−௤௤ሺଵ−௤ሻ, the results are qualitatively same. 
To simplify the analysis, we assumeʹሺͳ − ݍሻሺߠ − ߛሻ > ͳ.4 
 
Proposition 1 
In the end-user piracy model with network externality,  
(i) When Ͳ ൑ ܿ ൑ ݉�ݔ{ߜሺݍ, ߠ, ߛሻ, Ͳ} , the original developer accommodates 
piracy, the profit maximizing price is        *
1 1
2 1 1
q q c
p
q
  
 
       and the 
profit maximizing level of deterrence is    *
1
2 1 1
q c
x
q

 
     . 
(ii) Whenܿ ൒ ௤�ଶ  andߛ ൑ �ଶ, the piracy is blockaded; the original developer chooses 
zero deterrence level and its profit maximizing price is the monopoly price 
*
2
p  . 
(iii) In all the other cases, the original developer deters piracy completely. There 
are four different cases. 
(a) When݉�ݔ {ߠ ௤ሺଵ−௤ሻሺ�−�ሻ−ଵሺଶ−௤ሻሺ�−�ሻ , ݍߛ + ଶ�−�௤ሺ�−�ሻ} ൑ ܿ ൑ ௤�ଶ , the original developer's 
profit maximizing price is   * 22
qc
p
q
  
 
    and the profit maximizing level of 
deterrence is  * 2
2
2
q c
x
q

 
   . 
(b) When ߛ ൒ ଵ−௤ଶ−௤ ߠ  and ݉�ݔ{ሺͳ − ݍሻሺߠ − ʹߛሻ − ͳ,Ͳ} ൑ ܿ ൑ ݍߛ − ͳ , the 
original developer's profit maximizing price is  * 1 1p c q     and the 
profit maximizing level of deterrence is * 1x  . 
(c) When ߛ ൒ ଵ−௤ଶ−௤ ߠ  and  ݍߛ − ͳ ൑ ܿ ൑ ݉�݊ {ݍߛ + ଶ�−�௤ሺ�−�ሻ , ݍߛ} , the original 
developer's profit maximizing price is *p  and the profit maximizing level of 
deterrence is *x q c  . 
(d) When ܿ ൒ ݍߛ and ߛ ൒ �ଶ, the original developer's profit maximizing price is 
*p  and the profit maximizing level of deterrence is * 0x  . 
 
Thus, the only situation where we find support to allow piracy is when consumers’ taste 
variety is sufficiently large compared to the strength of network externality ( ߠ >݉�ݔ { ଵ௤ሺଵ−௤ሻ+ ߛ, ଵଵ−௤ + ʹߛ} ) and IPR protection is low (Ͳ ൑ ܿ ൑ ݉�ݔ{ߜሺݍ, ߠ, ߛሻ, Ͳ} ). 
Otherwise, piracy will be always deterred. Therefore, the existence of strong network 
externality itself cannot be a sufficient condition for the copyright holder to allow piracy 
in this general setup. 
In the following comparative statics analyses, we investigate further the impact of 
network externality on the extent of piracy.  
                                                 
4See Case I1 in the appendix for the role of this assumption. 
2.3 Comparative Statics 
2.3.1 The relationship between the network externality (ࢽ) and ࢾሺ�, �, ࢽሻ 
When Ͳ ൑ ܿ ൑ ݉�ݔ{ߜሺݍ, ߠ, ߛሻ, Ͳ} and > ݉�ݔ { ଵ௤ሺଵ−௤ሻ+ ߛ, ଵଵ−௤ + ʹߛ} , the pirate is 
accommodated. Clearly, asߛ increases, the condition ߠ > ݉�ݔ { ଵ௤ሺଵ−௤ሻ+ ߛ, ଵଵ−௤ + ʹߛ} is 
less likely to be satisfied. We are also interested in how ߜሺݍ, ߠ, ߛሻ changes as ߛ increases. 
Recall ߜሺݍ, ߠ, ߛሻ ≡ ݉�݊ {ߠ ௤ሺଵ−௤ሻሺ�−�ሻ−ଵሺଶ−௤ሻሺ�−�ሻ , ሺͳ − ݍሻሺߠ − ʹߛሻ − ͳ} . 
Since ∂∂γ ቀθ qሺଵ−qሻሺθ−γሻ−ଵሺଶ−qሻሺθ−γሻ ቁ = − θሺଶ−qሻሺθ−γሻ2 < Ͳ , and ��� (ሺͳ − ݍሻሺߠ − ʹߛሻ − ͳ) = −ʹሺͳ −ݍሻ < Ͳ , as ߛ  increases, the condition Ͳ ൑ ܿ ൑ ݉�ݔ{ߜሺݍ, ߠ, ߛሻ, Ͳ}  is less likely to be 
satisfied.  
We have shown that both Ͳ ൑ ܿ ൑ ݉�ݔ{ߜሺݍ, ߠ, ߛሻ, Ͳ}  and ߠ > ݉�ݔ { ଵ௤ሺଵ−௤ሻ+ߛ, ଵଵ−௤ + ʹߛ} are less likely to be satisfied as ߛ  increases, thus the following proposition 
holds. 
 
Proposition 2 
Given the regime of IPR protection and the degree of consumers’ taste variety, the 
possibility to accommodate end-user pirates by the copyright holder reduces as the 
network externality becomes stronger. 
  
Main Intuition: 
The main intuition behind this and subsequent results (Propositions 3 and 4) comes 
from the structure of the utility function considered in the analysis. Let us define the gross 
utility of consuming the original product as �௢  and the gross utility of consuming the 
pirated product as �௣. Observe that �௢ − �௣ = ሺͳ − ݍሻሺܺ + ߛܦ௢ሻ. The difference in gross 
utilities is increasing in ܦ௢
 
and independent of ܦ௣ . This implies that an additional 
consumer of the original product is more valuable for a consumer of the original product 
than for a consumer of the pirated product, while an additional consumer of the pirated 
product is as valuable for both. Hence, more piracy (i.e. higher ܦ௣) does not confer any 
additional advantage to the original product through network externalities while more users 
of the original product (i.e. higher ܦ௢) does.  
It also explains why stronger network externalities do not make piracy more 
profitable to the original producer. This feature is also reflected when the original producer 
adjusts it deterrence level as network effect gets stronger as we show below. 
 
2.3.2 The relationship between the network externality (ߛ) and the profit maximizing 
level of deterrence (x) 
WhenͲ ൑ ܿ ൑ ݉�ݔ{ߜሺݍ, ߠ, ߛሻ, Ͳ} , i.e., when the original firm accommodates the 
pirate, ∂�∗∂� = ଶሺଵ−௤ሻ[�+ሺଵ−௤ሻ�][ଶሺଵ−௤ሻሺ�−�ሻ−ଵ]2 > Ͳ. 
When the original firm deters the pirate completely, i.e., in the four cases (a)-(d) in 
Proposition 1(iii), ∂∂� ቀ ௤�−ଶ�௤2ሺ�−�ሻ+ଶቁ = ௤2ሺ௤�−ଶ�ሻ[௤2ሺ�−�ሻ+ଶ]2 > Ͳ , ∂∂� ሺͳሻ = Ͳ  , ∂∂� ሺݍߛ − ܿሻ = q > Ͳ , ∂∂� ሺͲሻ = Ͳ. 
We can also show that as ߛ increases, the original developer’s profit maximizing 
deterrence level is continuous and non-decreasing when the original developer moves from 
accommodation to complete deterrence, or moves from blockade to complete deterrence, 
or moves between different cases of complete deterrence.  
Thus, we have the result summarized in the following proposition:  
 
Proposition 3 
The copyright holder’s profit maximizing deterrence level to the end-user pirates is 
continuous and non-decreasing in the effect of network externality.  
 
2.3.3The relationship between the network externality (ߛ) and the rate of piracy 
We define the ratio of  p o pD D D  to measure the rate of piracy. Thus, the higher 
the ratio, the higher will be the rate of piracy. When Ͳ ൑ ܿ ൑ ݉�ݔ{ߜሺݍ, ߠ, ߛሻ, Ͳ}, i.e. when 
the original firm accommodates the pirate, we get �೛�೚+�೛ = ሺ�−�ሻ[ሺଵ−௤ሻ௤�−ሺଶ−௤ሻ�]−�ଶሺ�−�ሻሺଵ−௤ሻሺ௤�−�ሻ−�  (when 
the market is partially covered, i.e., ܦ௢ + ܦ௣ < ͳ) or �೛�೚+�೛ = ͳ − �+ሺଵ−௤ሻ�ଶሺଵ−௤ሻሺ�−�ሻ−ଵ (when the 
market is fully covered, i.e., ܦ௢ + ܦ௣ = ͳ). In all the other cases, entry is either completely 
deterred or blockaded; thus, the rate of piracy is zero.  
Under accommodation, simple computation yields ∂∂� ( �೛�೚+�೛) = − ௤�[�+�ሺଵ−௤ሻ][ଶሺ�−�ሻሺଵ−௤ሻሺ௤�−�ሻ−�]2 < Ͳ (when the market is partially covered),  ∂∂� ( �೛�೚+�೛) = − ଶሺଵ−௤ሻ[�+ሺଵ−௤ሻ�][ଶሺଵ−௤ሻሺ�−�ሻ−ଵ]2 < Ͳ (when the market is fully covered), 
so the rate of piracy is decreasing in ߛ. 
The above also verifies our main intuition described before. 
 
Proposition 4 
The rate of piracy and the degree of network externality is monotonically decreasing in the 
degree of network externality, i.e. the higher network effect, the lower is the piracy rate.  
 
3. Conclusion 
In this paper, we revisit the issue of whether a strong presence of network 
externality in the digital products market could always be a reason for the copyright holders 
to allow piracy in their market. A sizeable amount of previous literature answers this 
question in an affirmative way, saying that allowing piracy under the presence of strong 
network externality is profitable to the original producer. In this paper, we demonstrate that 
this result is generally not true in a framework of piracy which involves IPR protection and 
copyright holder’s costly effort to prevent piracy. There we show it is not only the strength 
of network externality that matters, but the relative difference between the consumers’ taste 
variety and the degree of network externality matters in the decision whether the copyright 
holder will allow piracy or not. Moreover, in the comparative statics analysis, we further 
show that as the degree of network externality increases, the strategic piracy deterrence 
level of the copyright holder actually increases, and the rate of piracy decreases. So the 
higher the strength of network effect, the lower will be the actual incidence of piracy.  
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Appendix: Choice of Profit Maximizing Price and Level of Deterrence by the Product 
Developer 
Problem I  
Given the constraints ݍ݌ ൒ ܿ + ݔ and ݔ ൒ Ͳ, ݌ ൒ Ͳ is automatically satisfied. Define 
Lagrangian 
            21
1 1
, , , 1 .
1 2
q p c x
L p x p x qp c x p c x q x
q
       
                  
,
The sufficient and necessary conditions for the optimum are the following:       
  
1 , , , 1 2 0
1
L p x q p c x
q
p q
      
         
,
,                        (A1) 
 
  
1 , , , 0
1
L p x p
x
x q
      
        
,
,                            (A2) 
  0, 0, qp c x qp c x       ,                                          (A3) 
    1 0, 0, 1 0p c x q p c x q              ,             (A4) 
0, 0, 0x x    .                                                        (A5) 
When solving this problem, we assume ߤ = Ͳ. If a negative value of x is obtained, then 
we will address the constraint ݔ ൒ Ͳ. 
Case I1: ߣ = Ͳ, ߟ = Ͳ 
Solving for p and x from (A1) and (A2) after plugging ߣ = Ͳ and ߟ = Ͳ into these 
equations yields
     
  
1 1
2 1 1
q q c
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1
2 1 1
q c
x
q

 
     . Note that 
when ʹሺͳ − ݍሻሺߠ − ߛሻ > ͳ, ݔ > Ͳ. This is why we assume ʹሺͳ − ݍሻሺߠ − ߛሻ > ͳ in 
Section 2.2 (before Proposition 1).  To simplify analysis, we will not explore the original 
producer’s profit maximizing price and level of deterrence when this assumption does not 
hold true. 
 We also need to check whether qp c x  and  1 0p c x q       are satisfied 
and we find that the former condition is satisfied when 
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1 1
2
q q
c
q
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latter condition is satisfied when   1 2 1c q      . So this case is the optimum if ܿ ൑ ݉�݊ {ߠ ௤ሺଵ−௤ሻሺ�−�ሻ−ଵሺଶ−௤ሻሺ�−�ሻ , ሺͳ − ݍሻሺߠ − ʹߛሻ − ͳ}. In this case, the developer’s profit is 
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     ,  where the superscript A indicates this is an accommodation 
case. 
Similarly, we can solve for p and x in all the other cases and also derive the 
conditions on c under which the respective case is the optimum. The details are omitted 
here and we list the results only. 
Case I2: ߣ = Ͳ, ߟ ൒ Ͳ 
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Case I4: ߣ ൒ Ͳ, ߟ ൒ Ͳ 
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Problem II  
Given the constraint ݌ ൒ ߛ , ݌ ൒ Ͳ  is automatically satisfied. Define Lagrangian 
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Again, there are four cases to consider, we omit the details here and list the results 
only. 
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Profit Comparison 
To obtain the product developer’s profit maximizing price and deterrence level, we 
have to compare its profits in Problem I and Problem II. For any given q and θ, we draw a 
figure in (c, γ) space to show the areas specified by the conditions given above for each 
case and then find out which expressions of the product developer’s profit are relevant in 
profit comparison. Profit comparison yields the results summarized by the following figure 
and Proposition 1. 
 
  
Figure A1   The distribution of the product developer’s profit maximization case 
 
 
